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lll. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
L Nature of Case: 
This is an administrative license suspension case presenting an issue of statutory 
interpretation. The Idaho I .egislature enacted and codified statutory provisions to set forth rules and 
procedures governing interaction of law enforcement officers with motorists ,vi thin the state who 
are under suspicion for driving while under the influence of alcohol, drugs or other intoxicants. This 
case involves an agency's interpretation and application of those rules and procedures that result 
from the direction of the Idaho legislature to the Idaho State Police to promulgate rules about 
evidentiary testing in cased of alleged driving under the influence. The Idaho Transportation 
Department is the agency that \\'as granted the authority to regulate the application of the 
administrative license suspension statute. Specifically at issue here is the ability of ITD to issue a 
final order in a contested case that is based upon a recommendation that does not have the full force 
and effect of law. 
2. Party Reference: 
The Respondent-Appellee, Idaho Transportation Department, is referred to as the State for 
the purposes of this argument. Petitioner-Appellant Mr. Peterson is specifically referred to by name. 
Idaho Transportation Department Hearing Examiner Skip Carter is referred to as the hearing officer 
for the purposes of this argument. 
3. Statement of Facts: 
On September 5, 2014, Tony E. Peterson was stopped by Idaho State Trooper Chad 
Montgomery at approximately 11 :30 PI\1 on southbound Thain Road near Airway Avenue in Nez 
Perce county. Trooper Montgomery's stated reason for the stop vrns that Mr. Peterson was operating 
a vehicle after sunset without tail lights. Upon Mr. Peterson's alleged admission of having 
consumed an alcoholic beverage prior to driving, Trooper Montgomery determined this admission 
was enough to formulate reasonable suspicion of impaired driving that therefore necessitated the 
administration of field a sobriety tests. Trooper Montgomery's report is devoid of any information 
or details addressing Mr. Peterson's performance of on the field sobriety tests and instead simply 
states that Mr. Peterson failed. Trooper Montgomery proceeded to test Mr. Peterson's breath for 
alcohol using the Lifeloc FC20 to measure the alcohol concentration in Mr. Peterson's breath. Upon 
Trooper Montgomery determination that Mr. Peterson had failed the breath test, Mr. Peterson was 
taken into custody. Trooper Montgomery's report was, unfortunately, quite vague. In addition to 
the very basic of facts, Trooper Montgomery's report was also devoid of any mention as to whether 
Trooper Montgomery noticed any vomiting or regurgitation during the monitoring period as required 
by SOP 6.1.4.1 and 6.1.4.2. Trooper Montgomery's report also failed to mention whether or not the 
15 minute observation person required by SOP Paragraph 6.1 was observed. In fact, Trooper 
Montgomery's report from the stop made no mention or reference to whether or not the field sobriety 
test was done in accordance to the procedures outlined by his controlling agency as Standard 
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Opeating Procedures (hereinafter" :~OPs ). lr,stead, Trooper Montgomery's report simply stated, "the 
tests were performed in compliance with ... and the standards and methods adopkd by the 
Department of Lav,· Enforcement" and Petitioner was taken into custody. (Departmental Report 
#L 140007842.) 
The readings from the Lifeloc FC20 and the results of Mr. Peterson's performance ofthe field 
sobriety evaluations resulted in the suspension of Mr. Peterson's driver's license, pursuant to Idaho 
Code§ 18--8002A(4). On September 11, 2014, Mr. Peterson requested a hearing before an ITD 
hearing officer pursuant to Idaho Code§ 18-8002A(7), contending all eleven subsections applied 
to Trooper Montgomery's management and handling of his stop and subsequent arrest. An 
Administrative License Suspension hearing was held on October 7, 2014 before hearing Officer Skip 
Carter. Taking into account the evidence presented at the hearing, including the testimony of Dr. 
D. Timothy Anstine, an associate professor of chemistry at Northv,rest Nazarene University who 
holds a Ph.D. in Organic Chemistry along with a prestigious distinction as a Fellow in Organic 
Chemistry from the University of California Berkeley regarding the standard of evidentiary testing 
relied upon by ISP and ITD that uses the word "should" rather than "shall" leaves too much 
discretion in the hands of the operator to yield an accurate result, and other evidence presented that 
referenced the recent Idaho case lmv \Vhich admonishes the Idaho State Police for not property 
promulgating its SOPs so that they have the full force and et1ect oflaw, the hearing officer issued 
an order, including findings of fact and conclusions oflaw, finding there that the proper procedures 
3 
had been followed and upholding the adt!tinistrat;ve suspension of Mr. Pete1son's driver's license. 
However, the hearing officer's findings were in direct conflict ·with the uncontroverted testimony of 
Dr. Anstine, which thereby evidences that the hearing officer's disregard of evidence presented by 
Mr. Peterson. 
ISSUES ON APPEAL 
A) Whether the District Court erred in finding that the record contained substantial 
evidence to support the hearing officer's determination that the tests for alcohol concentration 
administered at the direction of Trooper Montgomery were conducted in accordance with the 
requirements of Idaho Code§ 18-8004( 4) where Trooper Montgomery's report \Vas devoid of any 
information addressing the administration of and Mr. Peterson's performance on the field sobriety 
tests and merely stated ''the tests were performed in compliance with ... and the standards and 
methods adopted by the Department of Law Enforcement" and those standards and methods are 
arbitrary and capricious because they were established without adequately determining the applicable 
standard for reliability? 
ARGUMENT 
Introduction: 
Mr. Peterson respectfully argues that his administrative license suspension should have been 
vacated, first by Hearing Examiner Skip Carter, and subsequently by the District Court upon judicial 
review. This argument is based on the facts that at his Administrative License Suspension (herein 
4 
referred to as '·ALS .. ) hearing Mr. Peterson estabiished that the breath akuhol tesl was not 
performed as required in I.C § 18-8002A(2). 
Specifically, through the uncontroverted testimony of Dr. Timothy Anstine, the record contains 
substantial evidence that Trooper Montgomery failed to comply with Idaho Code § 18-8004 when 
he administered the breath alcohol test. This is in direct conflict with the findings ot facts and 
conclusions of law entered by the hearing officer and sustained by the District Court upon judicial 
review. 
Under Idaho law, the evidentiary standard used for purposes of reviewing an agency's 
findings to detennine whether they are supported by substantial and competent evidence, is 
"substantial and competent evidence" which is defined as "relevant evidence which a reasonable 
mind might accept to support a conclusion." Lane Ranch P'ship v. City of Sun Valley, 144 Idaho 
584, 590, 166 P.3d 374, 380 (2007). A reasonable mind cannot accept the conclusion that the 
Hearing Officer's Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and Order were based upon lawful 
procedure wherein the affidavit of Trooper Montgomery is merely a self-serving, conclusory 
statement that has little meaning when the affidavit attests to the Trooper's performance of 
evidentiary breath testing as compliant and compliance cannot reasonably be found when the 
standards and methods Trooper attests to using are subject to numerous and unsubstantiated 
revisions over time and none that are based on science. As confirmed by the district court, the only 
evidence the Hearing Officer relied upon to support his Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law 
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• <) 1 l t'~d · · ·r 1' • d · 1 ,. h · h 1 · ' ano . rc,er was L1e a 11 ava o1 rooper v1ontg'C,mery an tne resu i.s or t .-.: breat a conOi test 
obtained after Trooper Montgomery administered the evidentiary breath testing in compliance \Vith 
the elusive and transient standards adopted by the Idaho State Police. (R. P. 171 ). 
At issue here is whether Trooper Montgomery's administration of the evidentiary breath test was 
done in accordance with Idaho Code § 18-8004, when, the standards created by the Idaho State 
Police to effectuate its duty under § 18-8004 was not done properly. The simple answer to that 
question is "no" and, as such, the District Court was obligated to vacate Mr. Peterson's license 
suspension. Instead, the District Court sustained the hearing officer's decision and upheld the license 
suspension. It follows that the District Court should have found that the hearing officer's decision 
was based upon unlawful procedure and, therefore, based upon the reasons explained below, it erred. 
Standard On Review: 
In general, judicial review of agency proceedings is limited. The Idaho Administrative 
Procedures Act (hereinafter "IDAPA") governs the review of department decisions to deny, cancel, 
suspend, disqualify, revoke, or restrict a person's driver's license. See I.C. §§ 49-201, 49-330, 
67-5201(2), 67-5270. A hearing under LC. § 18-8002A results in an "agency action" and is 
therefore governed by the IDAPA. LC.§ 67-5240. See also Druffel v. State, Dep't of Transp., 136 
Idaho 853,855, 41 P.3d 739, 741 (2002). As such, an ITD administrative hearing officer's decision 
to uphold the suspension of a person's driver's license is subject to challenge through a petition for 
judicial review. 
6 
I.C § 18-8002A(8); Kane v. State. Dep't of Trans, .. i39 Idaho 586, 5~9, 83 P.3d 130, 133 
(Ct.App.2003 ). In an appeal from the decision of the district court acting in its appellate capacity 
under ID APA, this Court reviews the agency record independently of the district court's decision. 
l\farshall v. Idaho Dep't ofTransp., 137 Idaho 337,340.48 P.3d 666,669 (Ct.App.2002). 
Idaho Code§ 67-5279(1) sets out the scope of review. Bennett v. State. Dep't of Transp., 147 
Idaho 141, 206 P.3d 505 (Ct. App. 2009). Under the IDAPA, an agency's decision may be 
overturned only where its findings: a) violate statutory or constitutional provisions; b) exceed the 
agency's statutory authority; c) or made upon unlawful procedures; d) are not supported by 
substantial evidence in the record; ore) are arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion. LC.§ 67-
5279(3); Druffel v. State, Dep't of Transp .. 136 Idaho 853, 41 P.3d 739 (2002). As a practical 
matter, the reviewing court does not substitute its judgment for that of the agency as to the weight 
of the evidence presented. LC.§ 67-5279(1 ). Instead, the reviewing court must defer to the agency's 
findings of fact unless they are clearly erroneous. Castaneda v. Brighton Corp., 130 Idaho 923, 926, 
950 P.2d 1262, 1265 (1998). The party attacking the agency's decision must first illustrate the 
agency en-ed in a manner specified in I.C. § 67-5279(3), and then establish that a substantial right 
has been prejudiced. Druffel at 855. Once the driver has made an initial prima facie showing of 
evidence proving some basis for vacating the suspension, the burden shifts to the state to rebut the 
evidence presented by the driver. See Kane, 139 Idaho at 590, 83 P.3d at 134. 
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Appellate reviev; of the District Court's decision requires this court to review the agency 
record '·independently of the District Court's decision.'' Marshall v. De1 t. of Transp. 137 Idaho 337, 
340, 48 P.3d 666, 669 (Ct. App. 2002). 
L The District Court Erred in Finding That the Record Contained Substantial 
Evidence to Support the Hearing Officer's Determination That the Tests for Alcohol 
Concentration Administered at the Direction of Trooper Montgomery Were Conducted in 
Accordance with the Requirements of Idaho Code§lS-8004(4) Where Trooper Montgomery's 
Report Was Devoid of Any Information Addressing the Administration of and Mr. Peterson's 
Performance on the Field Sobriety Tests and Merely Stated "The Tests Were Performed in 
Compliance With ... and the Standards and Methods Adopted by the Department of Law 
Enforcement and Those Standards and Methods Are Arbitrary and Capricious Where They 
Were Established Without Adequately Determining the Applicable Standard for Reliability. 
The Administrative License Suspension statute (hereinafter "ALS"), LC. § l 8-8002A, 
requires that the Idaho Transportation Department suspend the driver's license of a driver who has 
failed a BAC test administered by a law enforcement officer. Wilkinson v. State Dept. of Transp, 
151 Idaho 784,264 P.3d 680 (Ct. App. 2011), LC.§ 18-8002A. The ALS hearing officer must 
uphold the suspension unless he or she finds, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the driver has 
shown one of several grounds enumerated in I.C. § l 8-8002A(7) for vacating the suspension. Id. 
The statute places the burden of proof on the driver to demonstrate to the ALS hearing officer that 
driving privileges should be reinstated if the facts fall within any of the five circumstances 
enumerated in LC. § l 8-8002A(7) . The hearing officer shall vacate the suspension if he or she 
finds, by a preponderance of the evidence, that, among other circumstances: 
8 
(cl) The !e.)/sfhr alcohol conc.:nff·otion. drugs or other intoxicmhzg suh,·rances {1dmini,tered 
ar the dire cf ion oj the peace officer irere not conducted in accordance 1t·ith the requirements 
of.section 18-800-1( 4) ... 
Idaho Code § 18-8004( 4) provides that tests to determine alcohol concentration of blood, 
urine, or breath must be performed in facilities or by methods approved by the Idaho State Police and 
in compliance with standards set by the State Police. Mahurin v. State Dep't of Transp., 140 Idaho 
656,658, 99 P.3d 125, 127 (Ct.App.2004). To carry out the authority conferred by that statute, the 
State Police issued standard operating procedure manuals establishing procedures for the 
maintenance and operation of breath test equipment. Id. See also IDAHO ADMIN. CODE 
11.03.01.014. In fact, noncompliance with those procedures is a ground for vacating an 
administrative license suspension under I.C. § 18-8002A(7)( d); Mahurin, 140 Idaho at 658-59, 99 
P.3d at 127-28. 
The Idaho Legislature has enacted a statutory scheme ·which allows for an expedient method 
for admitting a blood-alcohol test result into evidence without the need for expert testimony. State 
v. Bell. 115 Idaho 36, 38, 764 P.2d 113, 115 (Ct. App. 1988). This expedient method does not, 
however, ,vholly eliminate the need to need to establish a proper foundation for the test result 
because the State must still establish an adequate foundation. State v. Utz, 125 Idaho 127,129,867 
P.2d 1001, 1003 (Ct.App.1993); State v. Uhhy, 121 Idaho 1020, 1022, 829 P.2d 1369, 1371 
(Ct.App.1992). The State can proceed in one of two ways. First, it may establish that the 
administrative procedures, which ensure the reliability of that test, have been met. 
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State v. ~fazzuca, i 32 Idaho 868, 869, 979 P.2d 1226, 1227 (Ct.App.1999); State v. Utz. 125 Idaho 
127,129,867 P.2d lOOL 1003 (Ct.App.1993). UnderI.C § 18-8004(4), the State can meet this 
foundational requirement by showing that the ISP properly approved the procedural standards and 
equipment and an officer operated the equipment and administered the test in conformity with 
applicable standards. State v. Nickerson, 132 Idaho 406,411, 973 P.2d 758, 763 (Ct.App.1999). If 
the State cannot show conformity with the applicable test procedures, the test results are not 
automatically excluded. State v. Charan. 132 Idaho 341,343,971 P.2d 1165, 1167 (Ct.App.1998). 
Instead, and as a second option, the State can nevertheless make the test results admissible by calling 
an expert witness to establish the reliability of the test through his or her testimony addressing why 
procedural defects did not affect the reliability of test results in the particular case. Id. However, 
the State is rarely faced with the need to present expert testimony because it has simply relied on 
court decisions that have determined that an officer's affidavit stating compliance with the standards 
is enough to show that the standards \Vere applied and followed. It's important note the convenience 
of this reliance as the State would be hard pressed to find an expert witness to support its use of the 
SOPs because no expert, however ,veil-trained can ensure the reliability of a breath test result done 
,vithout a method known to yield a reliable result. The SOPs created by the Idaho State Police are 
done in an arbitrary and capricious manner that lacks an overall methodology, not to mention one 
that ,vould yield a reliable result. 
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/\bsent expert testimony explaining v,:hy any noncompliance with one or more ofth.:: requisite 
ISP administrative standards and methods for administration of the test did not affect the reliability 
and accuracy of the test results, compliance with those standards is a foundational prerequisite to 
having the test results admitted into evidence. Healy. 151 Idaho at 737, 264 P.3d at 78; Utz. 125 
Idaho at 129,867 P.2d at 1003; State v. Bradlev, 120 Idaho 566,568,817 P.2d 1090, 1092 
(Ct.App.1991); Bell. 115 Idaho at 38-40, 764 P.2d at 115-17. This foundational prerequisite is 
codified at Idaho Code§ 18-8004(4), wherein the State can meet the foundational requirement by 
showing a state agency approved the equipment and an officer operated the equipment and 
administered the test in conformity with applicable standards. The legislative purpose ofldaho Code 
§ 18-8004( 4) and making the test results admissible in judicial proceedings without expert witness 
testimony concerning the reliability of the testing equipment and procedure was, in part, to "make 
the practice uniform around the state ... and to avoid the 'economic burden to the state to have to 
furnish witnesses to provide superfluous verification.'" Statement of Purpose, HB 284 (RS 13389) 
(1987). As indicated by the legislative statements of purpose, this was is intended to streamline 
trials and reduce the costs of prosecution while simultaneously assuring the accuracy of the tests. 
Therefore, as Judge Lansing outlined in his written dissent to the majority's decision in Wheeler v. 
Idaho Transp. Dep't,, the ISP can only meet this objective and in accord with due process and 
demands of fundamental fairness ij there actually exists promulgated standards for administration 
of BAC tests that ensure accurate and reliable test results. 
1 1 
148 Idaho 378,387,223 P.3d 761, 770 (Ct. App. 2009) (emphasis added). Again, and in borrowing 
Judge Lansing's words," the quid pro quo for the convenience and economy of admitting test results 
pursuant to J.C. ~ 18-8004( 4) is that the ISP must promulgate ascertainable standards that, if 
complied with, wiil yield accurate BAC testing.'· But, as is well known, ISP has instead proceeded 
with an informal approach to its creation of the long relied upon, yet ever changing, Standard 
Operation Procedures and they only recently began the formal rule making procedure. Even the 
procedural safe guards of the formal rulemaking procedure were not enough protect the ISP from its 
own desire to quickly implement standards and methods that are easily and frequently changed, and 
not based upon science. This is evident by comparing the temporary rules with the most recent 
SOPs; the text is identical. As such, this can only lend to the conclusion that the proposed rules, 
currently operating under the status of a Temporary Rule, were not established with any concern with 
the reliability of the testing results. In fact, both the Temporary Rules and the SOPs lack the 
consistency and rigidity necessary to sustain the fixed admissibility authorized by the Legislature and 
required to ensure reliable testing. However, no such method exists. And in looking at the SOPs, 
and the Temporary Rules that exhibit the same verbiage, both are anything but standard and rigid 
insomuch as they arc frequently changing without any reliable or scientific reasoning for doing so. 
Even the Court of Appeals in In re: Hubbard made reference to this wherein it commented that " 
[t]he ISP posts its standard operating procedures and training and reference manuals on its ,vebsite, 
and it amends these documents from time to time. 
12 
152 Idaho 879,881,276 P.3d 75L 75?, (Ct. App. 2012). 
Both the frequently changing nature of the SOPs and the promulgation of a Temporary rule 
using the same language as SOPs are problematic. Especially considering an even newer version of 
the SOPs was issued on January 7, 2015 .... and January 8, 2015. The following description is 
illustrative: "6.0 Idaho Standard Operating Procedure Breath Alcohol Testing, Revision 5, Effective 
10/06/2014" is the most current version of the Idaho State Police's SOP for breath alcohol testing 
applicable in this case. Revision 5, dated 8/20/2013, was the second revision that occurred in the 
year 2013, with Revision 4 taking effect a mere seven (7) months prior. The year 2012 saw only one 
revision, Revision 3, but the year 2010 saw three (3) different editions of the SOPs. If the discussion 
stopped right there, it is patently obvious that these SOPs are readily changed and revised with 
relative ease and in a fast, and cost-effective, manner. This is in contrast to the typical time line for 
rule making \Vhen following the proper rule making procedures under the IDAP A. This arbitrary 
nature of making changes to the SOPs, at-will, cuts directly into the reliability of the breath testing 
results and is directly in conflict with the Legislature's intent. And, as Judge Lansing explains, " a 
"standard" that is merely a recommendation, and hence optional, is no standard at all-it is merely 
something that the officers may do if they wish or may disregard. Wheeler v. Idaho Transp. Dep't, 
148 Idaho 378,388,223 P.3d 761, 771 (Ct. App. 2009). As falling squarely within the definition 
of contested case codified at Idaho Code Section §67-5240, the final order of the hearing officer 
cannot be based upon a "recommendation" as something that is discretionary in nature cannot have 
13 
the full force and effect of Im.\·. And. due to the lack of rule making when cr-::ating the S0Ps, they 
truly arc standards because ruies that are created under the formai rule making procedure do have 
the full force and effect of law. Nevertheless, this discussion continues. 
Even though the ISP approach to issuing the S0Ps is painfully arbitrary, Mr. Peterson 
recognizes that it would likely to be of help to this reviewing Court to have an outline of what 
''procedure" the ISP follows when it wishes to change, revise or implement a new or existing SOP. 
It is important to note that the ISP's approach to these acts is so painfully informal that no official 
record exists. What we do know is that the S0Ps are frequently revised; the 2009 SOP was nine 
pages long and the first SOP of2010 was 21 pages long. But, we have no information about who 
determined what changes would be made and/or why or on what scientific basis. Interestingly, in 
reviewing the many changes made to the SOPs over the years, there appears to be significant 
attention to the words "must" and "shall." In fact, many instances of the word "must" or "shall" in 
earlier editions of the S0Ps have been seamlessly changed to "should." For example, in the 2009 
SOP, Section 6.1 stated: "Prior to evidentiary breath alcohol testing, the subject/individual must be 
monitored for at least fifteen (15) minute." (emphasis added) Compare this to the SOP dated 
November 1,2010, wherein section 6.1 then stated: "Prior to evidentiary breath alcohol testing, the 
subject/individual should be monitored for at least fifteen ( 15) minutes." ( emphasis added) On what 
basis were these adjustments made? It's relevant to note that many of these changes from 
mandatory language to discretionary language are reactive in nature insomuch that the change is 
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madC'. foil owing a court decision tha1 the ISP did not like. For cx&mplc, a number offorrner '·mus(· 
provisions were changed to "should'' recommendations following this Court's decision in Wheeler. 
To that extent, and from the documents obtained under the Freedom oflnformation Act, it appears 
that concerns, proposed revisions, and most all discussions regarding the SOPs occurred over e-mail. 
For instance, Jeremy Johnston, in an email dated December 19, 2012 and addressed to prosecutors, 
among others, states: "I have made some changes to the SOPs due to rulings, suggestions and need 
for clarifications. Please review this and see if there needs more or less added." There is no 
indication in any of the emails that the machines have changed and there is no explanation as to why 
30 years of mandatory language has been replaced \Vith discretionary language. Importantly, no 
scientific basis is noted to justify the changes from "must" to "should" in the SOP. 
On May 11, 2012, just a few days after the SOP was modified in April 2012, Jeremy 
Johnston sent the follo\ving email to one "kmumford@kcgovus": "What was the wording you 
wanted for the SOP change that we had talked about a few weeks back? I'm having a conference 
call next week about the changes and wanted to get the wording right in there so it works for all 
sides". What science justifies the changes to the SOP so often? The obvious fact is, there is no 
science or scientific basis for the change from mandatory to discretionary. As such, the standards and 
methods created by the Idaho State Police for breath alcohol testing are arbitrary and capracious. 
Additionally, both the hearing officer and the district court had Mr. Peterson's Exhibit J at 
their finger tips and through this exhibit the state of the SOPs is made clear from Dennis Stevenson, 
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\\fa) is the Administrative Ruics Coordinator for the State ofidaho. Tn referencing an opinion from 
Judge Stegner, Mr. Stevenson agrees that SOPs are not merely an internal management document 
as ISP has maintained, but that because the SOPs directly effect the rules of evidence, and in turn 
impact the rights of people, these SOPs arc rules. (R. p. 77). If formal rulemaking procedures are 
not follo\ved, the Agency action is arbitrary and capricious. 
The Idaho Supreme Court has determined an agency action is capricious if it was done 
without a rational basis. In American Law Association ofldaho/Nevada v. State, 142 Id. 544, 130 
P .3d 1082 (2006), the Court found an agency action to be arbitrary if it was done with disregard to 
the facts and circumstances presented or was done without adequately determining principles 
applicable standard principles. As applied here, what is the rational basis for replacing 30 years of 
mandatory language with discretionary language. What was the rational basis for making the SOPs 
a discretionary document? The answer is relatively clear: there was a blatant disregard of scientific 
principles, facts and circumstances. Can a scientific standard be discretionary? As such, the 
standards in operation now, as both SOPs and Temporary rules, are both arbitrary, and capricious. 
The legislature passed LC. § 18-8004(4) requiring valid methods of breath testing. The 
reason the legislature has allowed the expedited introduction of breath test, blood test and urine test 
results in DUis and ALS matters is because of the guarantee of science. See State v. Bell, 115 Id. 
36, 764 P.2d 113 (Ct. App. 1988), State v. Phillips, 117 Id. 609, 790 P.2d 390 (Ct. App. 1990), and 
State v. Nickerson, 132 Id. 406, 973 P.2d 758 (Ct. App. 1999). 
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ISP has made rules that weaken the breath testing standards so much that th.:rc is no scientific basis 
fiJr their reiiabiiity. The ITD hearing officer's reliance on these rule as providing a reliable result is 
most certainly arbitrary and capricious, if not completely unconstitutional. Moreover, the district 
court also has a duty to judge these "standards" pursuant to Idaho Rule of Evidence 702 regarding 
the scientific reliability of evidence. 
As evidenced by the discussion of the creation of the SOPs, and no\v the Temporary rules, 
it is concerning that ISP is more interested in having its breath testing survive legal challenges than 
it is promulgating standards using scientific standards to create reliable methods. And as this Court 
held in State v. Bell, an extremely reliable test result can only be the product of a test procedure 
which from previous use is known to be capable of producing an accurate result. 115 Idaho 36, 39, 
764 P.2d 113, 116 (Ct. App. 1988). Unfortunately, there is stark difference between is occurring and 
what should occur insomuch that ISP is operation under its own guise that discretion is in its favor 
so it surmises that the Bell court's holding simply affirms that it '·should.' base its SOPs on 
scientifically reliable methods instead of the actual result that the SOPs "must" be based upon a 
scientifically reliable method so as to confirm the reliable result and avoid the necessity of producing 
the evidentiary foundation for the admissibility of the test results. But, the present and long-
occurring status is that no attention is given to the fact that the procedures used to test and the 
operation of the breath test machines are both very scientific in nature and require adherence that 
facilitates proper use so as to provide a reliable result. 
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Even the Court of Appeals recognized the importance of a reliable result in that "the purpose of 
[LC.] § 18-8002, is to provide an incentive for motorists to cooperate in determining levels ofblood-
alcohol content by a reasonably precise scientific method.'' ( emphasis added). State v. Breed, 111 
Idaho 497. 725 P.2d 202 (Ct. App. 1986). Moreover, the reason the legislature has allmved the 
expedited introduction of breath test results in DUis and ALS matters is because of the guarantee of 
science. See State v. Bell, 115 Idaho 36, 764 P.2d 113 (Ct. App. 1988), State v. Phillips, 117 ldaho 
609, 790 P.2d 390 (Ct. App. 1990). 
The hearing officer's findings of facts and conclusions oflaw were accompanied by a concise 
and brief statement regarding what evidence in the record he relied on to support his ultimate 
findings. The hearing officer acknowledged Dr. Anstine's testimony but dismissed it in favor of a 
"logical" understanding of the effect of the word "should" instead of"shall." In doing so, the hearing 
officer also dismisses the significance of reliability. The record contains direct testimony from a 
well educated, highly trained and prestigious Doctor of Chemistry regarding the scientific 
shortcomings of the creation and adoption ofISP's standards for administration ofan alcohol breath 
test. As such, the hearing officer's decision cannot be said to be supported by the record as a whole. 
Therefore, this court must reverse the findings of the hearing officer and remand the matter back to 
the Department with instructions to vacate the suspension of Petitioner's driving privileges. 
Reliability is a fundamental requirement in general, but is especially required when the 
legislature has allowed the expedited introduction of breath test results in DU Is and ALS matters. 
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The reliance on the SOPs as the standards and procedures created by the ISP to be the answer to its 
delegated authority to "prescribe by rule" testing instruments and methods that are approved by the 
ISP is problematic. What's more, one look at how the SOPs are created, evaluated and changed will 
no doubt illustrate the terrifying picture of SOPs devoid of scientific reiiabi!ity. The following is 
illustrative of this problem: In a 2012 case, In Re: Hubbard, the Court of Appeals was presented 
with a review of a trial court's decision, acting in its appellate capacity to review the decision of the 
hearing officer in an ALS hearing. On appeal, the petitioner Hubbard argued that she vvas entitled 
to relief from suspension because her tests for alcohol concentration were not conducted by a method 
that was approved by the ISP pursuant to Idaho Code§ 18-8004(4). See I.C. § 18-8002A(7)(d). In 
re Hubbard, 152 Idaho 879,882,276 P.3d 751, 754 (Ct App. 2012). Specifically, Hubbard asserted 
that the most recent performance verification prior to her breath test yielded an alcohol concentration 
result of .042 for a solution with a target value of .083. Id. She argued that because this result fell 
far outside of the acceptable l O percent variance, the officer violated the prescribed procedures by 
conducting her breath test with a machine that had "failed" the most recent performance verification. 
Id In its \VTitten opinion, the Court of Appeals stated, "[w]e are constrained to disagree." Id. at 882. 
In that case, the Court of Appeals painted the painful picture of just how problematic the 
unreliability of the SOPs are by outlining that the SOPs (in effect at the time of Hubbard's test) "did 
not require that the most recent performance verification demonstrate that the equipment is operating 
properly before a breath test." Id. The Court of Appeals continued, "[r] ather, SOP 5.1.3 states that 
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a 'performance verification solution must be pcrfom1ed within 24 hours, before or after an 
evidentiary test to be approved for evidcntiary use."' Id. Under the standard outlined in the SOP 
referenced above, the Court of Appeals acknowledged that an instrument is approved for evidentiary 
use (and its results fast tracked to admissible evidence) "if it yielded an acceptable performance 
verification within twenty-four hours after an evidentiary breath test, even if it had failed the most 
recent performance verification preceding the evidentiary test." Id. 
Without a method of ensuring reliability the results cannot be are not admissible as evidence 
that Mr. Peterson failed the evidentiary breath test. The method created by ISP to produce reliable 
breath test results fails by the sheer fact that the mandatory language once contained in the methods 
have been changed to discretionary, and as testified by Dr. Anstine, give the administrating officer 
too much discretion to therefore provide a reliable testing result. At the ALS hearing, Dr. Anstine 
specifically testified that using the word ·should' rather than 'shall' gives the operator an 
impermissible amount of discretion and leaves a lot of subjectivity to the data, which cannot 
therefore amount to a reliable result. Our Supreme Court has long held that the word 'may' is a 
permissive term expressing a right of discretion whereas the \vords 'must' and 'shall' are mandatory. 
Rife v. Long, 127 Idaho 841,848 (1995). More recently, the Idaho Court of Appeal held the word 
'should' is not a mandatory term. The word 'should' is properly interpreted as an advisory term or 
strong recommendation. Wheeler v. Idaho Transp Dept., 148 Idaho 3 78 (Ct. App 1985). 
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In Wheeler, petitioner failed to meet his evidentiary burden because he simply alleged that the office.:.-
failed to perform a task he 'should' have done. Dr. Anstine testified that as to Paragraph 6.1 which 
reads'· 
prior to evidentiary breath alcohol testing, subject/individual should be monitored for 15 minutes,'' 
the use of "should" gives the officer discretion on whether or not to monitor a testing subject for 15 
minutes. (ALS Hrg. Tr. p.14 1. 4 ). He further testified that from a perspective of the scientific 
community, paragraph 6.1 is not an adequate standard because the scientific community is not given 
that discretion to choose one way or the other if we want to have its data validated. (ALS Hrg. Tr. 
p.15 In. 1-5). In response to questions about Paragraph 6.1.4, Dr. Anstine testified that where it says 
that during the monitoring period the operator should be alert for any event that might influence the 
accuracy of the breath test, this cannot be considered an adequate scientific standard because if the 
operator is given the discretion to monitor the situation, that leaves a lot of subjectivity to the data. 
(ALS Hrg. Tr. p.15 ln.20-23). Ultimately, Dr. Anstine testified that in order for the standards created 
by the SOPs to survive the scientific muster ofreliability, the standards must be mandatory. Through 
the testimony of Dr. Anstine and his written report identified as Mr. Peterson's Exhibit I, there is 
sufficient evidence to show that the standard operating procedures for the administration of breath 
tests lack the scientific rigor to produce reliable results. Just as a lmv cannot ignore the rules of 
scientific procedure the ISPs standards cannot ignore the rules of scientific procedure either, nor can 
it circumvent the standards of reliability established by the scientific community, which is exactly 
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\Yith the SOPs are attempting to do. The laissez:f'aire approach cunently adopted by the ISP cannot 
ensure reliability to the required standard necessary for the constitutional application of J.C. 18-
8004(4). 
Due to the discretionary language of the SOPs, the ISP has not established a standardized and 
uniform method for the administration and testing ofalcohol breath concentration. Though the Court 
of Appeals has held that when the method is not complied with an expert may be called to establish 
reliability, no expert, however well-trained, can ensure the reliability of a breath test result done 
without a standardized and uniform method known to yield a reliable result. Under the language of 
the SOPs, each and every administration of an alcohol breath test should be difterent. There is 
nothing standardized and unifom1 when each application is different. Therefore, where no standard 
method exists, reliability cannot be established. 
The methods ISP created for the administration and testing of alcohol breath testing were 
created without complying with reasonable standards within the scientific community so as to result 
in a reliable test result. Idaho code mandates the testing for alcohol concentration be done in 
accordance with method approved by the ISP. ISP's attempt at compliance with that mandate 
consists of their issuing Standard Operating Procedures for the various breath testing devices. As 
discussed above, the creation and subsequent revisions to the SOPs \Vere done without deference to 
the standards required by the scientific community to ensure a reliable test result. The legislature 
required the ISP to adopt a method that would act as a guarantor of admissibility and the ISP has 
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acknowledged that the SOPs are its attempt to. do so. But, as the above discussior: outlined ,:md 
which rhe testimony of Dr. Anstine complements, these standards fall unconscionably short of the 
requisite standard of the scientific community. Therefore, the resuits of the evidentiary alcohol breath 
test in this case is not reliable, as the record so establishes, and as such, the hearing officer's decision. 
Because a scientific foundation of the standard operating procedures is absent, the results of 
the evidentiary alcohol breath test in this case is not reliable, and as the record so establishes, the 
hearing officer's decision must be reversed where reliability is especially required when the 
legislature has allowed the expedited introduction of breath test results in DUis and ALS matters. 
Therefore, the hearing officer's decision must be reversed because it ,vas based upon unlav,1ful 
procedure where the breath test for alcohol concentration was not conducted by a method that is 
reliable and therefore in compliance with Idaho Code § 18-8004( 4) and the State did not present any 
expert witness testimony to save the lack of foundation for admissibility of the breath test resulis. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons stated herein, Petitioner-Appellant Tony Peterson, respectfully requests that 
this Court reverse the findings of the !fearing Officer and remand the matter back to the State with 
instructions to vacate the suspension of Mr. Peterson's driving privileges. 
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